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Abstract
Over 2,589 individuals sit in prison, where they have been condemned
to die for crimes they committed before their eighteenth birthday. At least a
quarter of these individuals received this sentence for accessorial felony
murder, or a crime in which they did not kill or intend to kill the victim.
Beginning with Roper v. Simmons in 2005 and continuing with Graham v.
Florida in 2010, recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has recognized
that juveniles are fundamentally different from adults in ways that limit the
constitutionality of imposing adult punishment on them. In June 2012, the
Supreme Court held that sentencing juveniles to mandatory life without
parole constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in another landmark
ruling, Miller v. Alabama. Miller did not extend Graham’s categorical rule
against life without parole to those convicted of homicide, including
accessorial felony murder. However, it gives at least 2,000 individuals
currently serving life without parole for crimes they committed as juveniles
a chance at resentencing, and requires that the sentencer take into account
their child status and any other mitigating circumstances surrounding their
offense in meting out a new sentence.
This Note focuses on juvenile life without parole and current Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence in the context of felony murder and makes two
arguments. First, it argues that the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by
Graham categorically prohibits sentencing those juveniles who do not kill
or intend to kill to life without parole. Second, it argues that even without a
categorical rule, lower courts properly applying Miller should resentence
those who do not kill or intend to kill to something less than life without
parole.
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INTRODUCTION
After Cain kills his brother Abel in the Old Testament, God appears and
tells Cain he will forever be a “fugitive and a vagabond” upon the earth.1
Although God does not punish Cain with death, he condemns him to
perpetual shame as an outsider in the land of Nod, never again to return to
Eden.2 In Roper v. Simmons,3 the Supreme Court laid the groundwork for
its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence challenging the imposition of adult
punishment on juvenile4 offenders, and held that sentencing juveniles to
death constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.5 However, as juveniles
continue to be prosecuted as adults, far too many of them have been
sentenced to a different kind of death—to live and die within the walls of
adult prisons, forever banished from society in their own land of Nod.
In 2011, the Supreme Court revisited the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibitions on the cruel and unusual punishment of juvenile offenders in
Graham v. Florida,6 where the defendant, Terrence Graham, was
sentenced to life without parole for his participation in a home-invasion
robbery when he was sixteen.7 The Court reversed Graham’s sentence and
held that sentencing juveniles to life without the possibility of parole for a
nonhomicide offense is unconstitutional.8 The Court affirmed its
conclusion in Roper that developmental differences in juveniles make them
categorically less culpable than adults. Specifically, it cited their lack of
maturity and impulsiveness; limited control over their environment;
increased vulnerability to peer pressure; and unformed character.9 The
Court found that juveniles “cannot with reliability be classified among the
worst offenders,” and that it is morally unacceptable “to equate the failings
of a minor with those of an adult” because there is a greater possibility that
a minor’s characteristic deficiencies will be reformed.” It required states to
give juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses a “meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrable maturity and

1. Genesis 4:12.
2. Genesis 4:16.
3. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
4. This article employs the term “juvenile” and “child” as the Supreme Court does—to refer
to any child who was under the age of eighteen at the time of his or her offense and was tried as an
adult. The term “adolescent” is also used interchangeably.
5. Roper, 543 U.S. at 573–74 (abrogating Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1988), which
held that the death penalty could be imposed on juvenile offenders between the ages of sixteen and
seventeen). The Eighth Amendment, which provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted,” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, is
made applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 560.
6. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
7. Id. at 2018–19.
8. Id. at 2034.
9. Id. at 2026 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
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rehabilitation.”10
Despite Roper and Graham,11 and a proliferation of nueroscientific
evidence that juveniles have an extraordinary capacity for change and
rehabilitation,12 there are an estimated 2,589 individuals in the United
States who were tried as adults and are now serving life without parole for
crimes they committed before their eighteenth birthday.13 The lives of most
of these children before they went to prison were filled with trauma.14 They
grew up in extremely poor, violent neighborhoods.15 They suffered abuse,
neglect, brutality, and a dire lack of adult and familial support,16 and as
juveniles, they lacked the ability to remove themselves from this trauma.17
Of course, the devastating backgrounds of these individuals do not justify
the harm they inflicted when they committed their crimes. But their
haunting profiles demand an honest assessment of whether a desire for
retribution should outweigh any commitment to their rehabilitation and
10. Id. at 2030.
11. Id. at 2026–27.
12. See, e.g., Charles Geier & Beatriz Luna, The Maturation of Incentive Processing and
Cognitive Control, 93 PHARMACOLOGY, BIOCHEMISTRY & BEHAV. 212, 218 (2009) (concluding that
the lack of cognitive development in adolescents leading to risk taking and impulsive behavior is
“best . . . understood as an emergent property of a still-maturing brain”).
13. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STATE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED 2,589 JUVENILE OFFENDERS
SERVING LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE (2009), [hereinafter JUVENILES SERVING LWOP], available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/updatedJLWOP10.09.pdf. In its initial
report, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD
OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2005) [hereinafter THE REST OF THEIR LIVES], available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/TheRestofTheirLives.pdf. Human Rights Watch
(HRW) explained that it is difficult to get a precise number of those serving juvenile life without
parole because individual states’ departments of corrections do not provide publicly accessible
statistics about juvenile offenders incarcerated in adult prisons, and there is no national database
with this information. HRW “collect[ed] [this] data . . . by requesting that it be specially
produced . . . by each state’s corrections department. Id. Despite the difficulty in obtaining a
concrete number, it is clear that the number of individuals serving juvenile life without parole has
increased significantly since 2005. See id. at 1 (finding that in 2005, 2,225 children had been
sentenced to life without parole).
14. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: SENTENCING 13- AND 14-YEAR-OLD
CHILDREN TO DIE IN PRISON 15 (2007) [hereinafter CRUEL AND UNUSUAL], available at
http://eji.org/eji/files/Cruel%20and%20Unusual%202008_0.pdf; ASHLEY NELLIS, PH.D., THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 8–13
(2012) [hereinafter THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS].
15. See reports cited supra note 14.
16. See id. Before they were sentenced to die in prison, approximately a third of these
children were living in public housing, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS, supra note 14, at 9; almost
80% witnessed violence in their homes; nearly half were themselves victims of physical abuse, id. at
10; one fifth were victims of sexual abuse; 40% were enrolled in special education classes, id. at 13;
and more than a quarter had a parent in prison, id. at 12.
17. The Supreme Court in Roper explained that “[A]s legal minors, [juveniles] lack the
freedom that adults have to extricate themselves from a criminogenic setting.” 543 U.S. 551, 569
(2005).
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redemption. As it stands, society has sent an unequivocal message to these
children that no matter what transformative change and growth they
undergo, they are forever irredeemable.18 This practice represents a
complete departure from the rehabilitative ideals that led to the creation of
a separate juvenile justice system in this country, a system intended to
replace punitive treatment of child offenders in light of their lessened
culpability and great capacity for change.19 This departure is particularly
shameful given that the United States is the only country in the world
known to have any children serving this sentence.20
While Graham gave the 123 individuals serving juvenile life without
parole for nonhomicide offenses21 a second chance at redemption, it did
nothing to alleviate the bleak futures of the rest of those serving the
sentence. Perhaps unsurprisingly, approximately 93% of the 2,589
juveniles tried as adults and serving life without parole were convicted of a
homicide offense.22 More surprising is that a conservative estimate shows
that 26% of these individuals were convicted of felony murder, or murder
based on accessorial liability23—often in cases in which the juvenile
participated in a robbery or burglary during which an accomplice killed the
victim without the juvenile’s knowledge or intent.24 The child-status of
these defendants and the circumstances of their offenses make
18. See THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 82.
19. See infra Sections II.A–B.
20. Connie de la Vega & Michelle Leighton, Sentencing Our Children to Die in Prison:
Global Law and Practice, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 983, 989 (2008) (explaining that while “ten countries
other than the United States . . . have laws with the potential to permit” life without parole for
juveniles, “there are no known cases where this has occurred”). The United States has been the lone
dissenter among over 180 countries who have voted to ratify The United Nations General
Assembly’s resolutions to abolish life without parole for juveniles. See G.A. Res. 61/146, ¶ 31(a),
U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/146 (Dec. 19, 2006); G.A. Res. 62/141, ¶ 36(a) U.N. Doc. A/Res/62/141 (Dec.
18, 2007); G.A. Res. 63/241, ¶ 43(a), U.N. Doc. A/Res/63/241 (Dec. 24, 2008).
21. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2024 (2010).
22. THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 27. Contrary to popular assumption, an
estimated 59% of children received life without parole for their first criminal conviction. Id. at 1.
23. “Felony murder” and “accessorial felony murder” are used interchangeably in this Note to
refer to murder based on transferred intent: where an accomplice kills the victim, and the defendant
does not himself kill or intend to kill. In these cases, the defendant’s intent to commit the
underlying felony substitutes as his intent to kill. See infra notes 223–227 and accompanying text.
24. THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 27. According to HRW there are roughly 673
juveniles (26% of 2,589 total individuals) serving life without parole for felony murder, or for
“aiding and abetting” a murder in which another person pulled the trigger. Id. In many of these
cases, the triggerman was an older accomplice. Id.; JUVENILES SERVING LWOP, supra note 13.
While data is not available to confirm a concrete number, more in-depth research in specific
jurisdictions suggests that this may be a conservative estimate. See THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra
note 13, at 27–28. HRW notes that in Colorado 33% of the 24 juveniles investigated by HRW were
serving life without parole for felony murder, and in Michigan nearly half of the 146 youth
surveyed by the ACLU in 2004 were sentenced to life without parole for felony murder, or for
“‘aiding and abetting’ a murder in which another person pulled the trigger.” Id.
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unconscionable such an ultimate condemnation for murders they did not
intend or perpetrate. Although the Court in Graham reasoned in dicta that
“a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice
diminished moral culpability” and is “categorically less deserving of the
most serious forms of punishment,”25 the Court was not forced to address
the issue of unintentional felony murder because no one was killed during
the commission of Terrence Graham’s crime.26 And unfortunately, without
a direct mandate from the high Court, lower courts have interpreted
Graham narrowly and have refused to extend its categorical rule to
juveniles convicted of felony murder.27
But little more than a year after Graham, in June 2012, the Supreme
Court issued another landmark ruling in Miller v. Alabama,28 in which it
consolidated the cases of petitioners Evan Miller and Kuntrel Jackson29—
each convicted of homicide and sentenced to mandatory life without parole
at the age of fourteen.30 A narrow 5–4 majority held that a mandatory
sentence of life without parole for a juvenile convicted of any offense
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment,31 and remanded both cases for
25. 130 S. Ct. at 2027.
26. See id. at 2018.
27. See, e.g., Bear Cloud v. State, 2012 WY 16, 35 (Wyo. 2012); Bell v. State, 2011 Ark.
379, *1 (Ark. 2011); State v. Ninham, 797 N.W.2d 451, 463, 471 (Wis. 2011); People v. Adderley,
No. B217620, 2011 WL 817751, *12 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011) (unpublished); State v.
Andrews, 329 S.W.3d 369, 377–78 (Mo. 2010); Meadoux v. State, 325 S.W.3d 189, 196 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010); State v. Pierce, 225 P.3d 1146, 1147–48 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010). All of these
courts have held that felony murder is a homicide offense and therefore does not fall under
Graham’s categorical rule. Cf. Arrington v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D155, 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)
(refusing to apply Graham’s categorical ban to felony murder but holding that Graham requires a
narrow proportionality review on a case-by-case basis for juveniles mandatorily sentenced to life
without parole for accessorial felony murder).
28. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
29. See 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011). The Equal Justice Initiative (EJI) argued both Miller v.
Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs. See Brief for Petitioner Miller, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455
(2012) (No. 10–9646), 2012 WL 92505, ECF No. 20; Brief for Petitioner Jackson, Jackson v.
Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (Nov. 7, 2012) (No. 10–9647), 2012 WL 92506 [hereinafter Jackson Brief].
30. In both cases, EJI argued for a categorical rule prohibiting life without parole for
individuals fourteen and younger and alternatively for a rule prohibiting any mandatory sentence of
life without parole. In Kuntrell Jackson’s case, EJI also argued for a rule prohibiting the sentence in
cases involving accessorial felony murder. See Jackson Brief, supra note 29, 2012 WL 92506, *63–
66. EJI previously argued the companion case to Graham, Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2059
(2010), in which a mentally disabled thirteen-year-old was sentenced to life without parole for
sexual battery. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2010)
(No. 08-7621) (filed Dec. 4, 2008). Sullivan was dismissed as improvidently granted in a per
curium opinion. 129 S. Ct. at 2059). EJI has been instrumental in challenging life without parole
sentences for juveniles, and in the development of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence challenging
this punishment. See Children in Adult Prison, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE,
http://www.eji.org/childrenprison (last visited Feb. 19, 2013).
31. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
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resentencing.32
In reaching this holding, the Miller majority relied on two lines of
precedent.33 First, it concluded that Roper and Graham require that a
sentencing body “take into account how children are different, and how
those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime
in prison.”34 Second, because Graham likened juvenile parole to a sentence
of death, Miller relied on the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
requiring individualized sentencing in capital punishment,35 and concluded
that “a sentencer [must] have the ability to consider the mitigating qualities
of youth,”36 including the age and background of a child offender and the
circumstances surrounding the offense.37 The Miller majority explained
that although Graham’s “flat ban” against juvenile life without parole was
explicitly confined to nonhomicide offenders, “none of what [it] said about
children . . . is crime specific,” and its “reasoning implicates any lifewithout-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile.”38 The majority also
explained that “given all” the Court has said “about children’s diminished
culpability and heightened capacity for change” in Roper, Graham, and
Miller, it “think[s] appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this
harshest penalty will be uncommon.”39 In other words, only in the most
extreme cases involving juvenile offenders would a sentence of life
without parole constitute a legally proportionate sentence under the Eighth
Amendment.
The Miller Court declined to categorically prohibit juvenile life without
parole, or alternatively to address whether Graham requires a categorical
rule prohibiting the sentence for those who did not kill or intend to kill.40
However, Miller invalidated juvenile mandatory life without parole
statutes in twenty-nine jurisdictions,41 and provides a chance at
resentencing for at least 2,000 individuals sentenced under these statutes.42
32. Id. at 2475.
33. Id. at 2463.
34. Id. at 2469.
35. Id. at 2467.
36. Id. at 2467, 2475 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
37. Id. at 2475.
38. Id. at 2465.
39. Id. at 2469.
40. See id. at 2469. Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, wrote a
concurrence in which he argued that “the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Graham forbids
sentencing [a juvenile] to such a sentence, regardless of whether its application is mandatory or
discretionary under state law.” Id. at 2475 (Breyer, J., concurring). See infra Part V.
41. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470–71 n.9 (explaining that “26 states and the Federal Government
make life without parole the mandatory . . . punishment for some form of murder” for children
beginning at age fourteen or younger, Louisiana makes the punishment mandatory for children as
young as fifteen, and Texas for seveteen-year-olds).
42. See id. at 2477 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court accepts that over 2,000 of those
[serving juvenile life without parole] received that sentence because it was mandated by a
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Further, many of those mandatorily sentenced to life without parole were
convicted of accessorial felony murder,43 and Miller therefore requires that
they be resentenced.44 In resentencing them, the judge or jury is also
required to consider any mitigating evidence, including their age when they
committed their crime, their background, and other mitigating
circumstances surrounding the offense.45 Because juveniles who do not kill
or intend to kill cannot be classified among the most culpable juvenile
offenders,46 Miller should result in resentencing these individuals to
something less than life without parole (the harshest penalty available to
juvenile offenders).
This Note focuses on juvenile life without parole in the context of
felony murder and makes two arguments. First, it argues that the Eighth
Amendment, as interpreted by Graham, categorically prohibits sentencing
those juveniles convicted of accessorial felony murder—those who do not
kill or intend to kill—to life without parole. Second, it argues that lower
courts properly applying Miller should resentence those who do not kill or
intend to kill to something less than life without parole. Part I examines the
case of Kuntrell Jackson—who was sentenced to juvenile life without
parole for accessorial felony murder47—and compares it with Graham to
raise questions about diminished culpability and proportionality in
sentencing juveniles to the harshest of punishments. Part II traces the legal
and political developments that transformed the juvenile justice system
from one of rehabilitation into one of retribution, justifying the prosecution
and sentencing of juveniles as adults and subjecting them to death in prison
sentences. Part III explains how the Court has applied the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment to scale back
the adult punishment of children, and where it has stopped short. Part IV
discusses the doctrine of accessorial felony murder, and argues that the
Court should extend its categorical rule in Graham to juveniles convicted
of this offense. Finally, Part V makes two suggestions for lower courts
legislature.”).
43. There is no data that gives an estimate of how many of those mandatorily sentenced to life
without parole are serving the sentence for felony murder. However, HRW estimates that at least
26% of all individuals serving life without parole are serving the sentence because of felony
murder. See supra note 24. Because most states classify felony murder as first degree murder, or a
capital offense, see Richard A. Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of
Death, 31 B.C. L. REV. 1103, 1105–06 (1990), and most mandatory juvenile life without parole
statutes encompass first degree murder, see State-By-State Legal Resource Guide, UNIV. OF S.F.
SCH. OF LAW (Mar. 1, 2013, 12:10 PM), http://www.usfca.edu/law/jlwop/resource_guide/, it is
likely that HRW’s estimate also applies to those juveniles mandatorily sentenced to life without
parole for felony murder. By this logic, there are at least 500 individuals serving mandatory life
without parole for felony murder who must be resentenced under Miller. See supra note 42.
44. Miller, 132. S. Ct. at 2475.
45. Id.
46. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring); see infra Section IV.A.
47. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461 (majority opinion).
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resentencing juveniles under Miller.
I. KUNTRELL JACKSON AND THE CASE FOR REDEMPTION
Kuntrell Jackson grew up in the public housing projects of Blytheville,
Arkansas, a community racked by poverty, drugs, and violence.48 He had
little in the way of role models. His father left before he was born and was
replaced by his mother’s boyfriend: an abusive alcoholic, a leech on the
family’s resources, and the only father figure Kuntrell ever knew.49
Kuntrell’s mother went to prison for shooting a neighbor when he was six,
and his older brother followed in her footsteps just seven years later.50 Not
long after that, his mother’s boyfriend left, two of his teenage sisters
became pregnant, and several other relatives were also sent to prison.51
Perhaps in part because of these formidable challenges during childhood,
Kuntrell’s mental capacity has been described as “borderline or near
borderline,” and “at the 4th percentile compared to children his age.”52
In 1999, seventeen days after Kuntrell turned fourteen, he, his older
cousin Travis Booker, and another older boy Derrick Shields decided to
rob the local Movie Magic video store while walking through a housing
project in Blytheville.53 It was only once the boys were headed to the video
store that Kuntrell realized that Shields was carrying a shotgun in his
sleeve.54 Although the other boys went inside when they arrived at the
store, Kuntrell chose to stay outside.55 Shields pointed the shotgun at the
clerk, Laurie Troup, and demanded money six or seven times, to which she
refused.56 Kuntrell entered the store during this interaction.57 The parties
disputed at trial whether Kuntrell warned Troup that “[w]e ain’t playin’,”
or told his codefendants “I thought you all was playin’.”58 When Troup
threatened to call the police, Shields shot the clerk and the boys fled the
video store without taking any money.59
The prosecutor in Kuntrell’s case had the choice to send Kuntrell to
juvenile court or to try him as an adult for either capital felony murder or
48. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Jackson v. Arkansas, WL 478600 (Ark. Feb 9, 2011),
petition for cert. filed, No. 09-145, 2011, 5 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Jackson Petition].
49. Id. at 4–5.
50. Id. at 5.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 5 (quoting the record).
53. Id. at 5; Jackson v. State, 194 S.W.3d 757, 758 (Ark. 2004).
54. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2461 (2012).
55. Id.
56. Jackson, 194 S.W.3d at 758–59.
57. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461.
58. Id. The state presented codefendant Booker’s pretrial statement that Kuntrell said “we
ain’t playin’.” Id. At trial Booker recanted this statement, and both he and Kuntrell testified that
Kuntrell actually said “I thought you all was playin’.” Jackson, 194 S.W.3d at 760.
59. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461.
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aggravated robbery.60 He chose to try him as an adult for both offenses.61
Kuntrell’s trial counsel moved to transfer the case to juvenile court, but the
trial court denied the motion after considering the statutory factors at the
transfer hearing.62 In denying Jackson’s motion, the trial judge emphasized
the “seriousness of the offense,” in particular the fact that the “offense
involved a firearm, was for pecuniary gain, and endangered the life of
another.”63 The judge did not appear to place any weight on Kuntrell’s
traumatic upbringing, his nonviolent juvenile arrest history (involving
shoplifting and three incidents of car theft), his limited involvement in the
crime, and the fact that he inflicted no violence on the victim.64 Kuntrell
remained in criminal court and was convicted by a jury of capital murder
and aggravated robbery.65
Under Arkansas’s felony murder statute,66 the state had a burden only to
prove that Kuntrell had attempted to commit a robbery and that in the
course of that offense he or his accomplice caused the clerk’s death “under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life.”67 It was undisputed that Shields was the one who shot the clerk, and
the prosecution was under no obligation to prove, and did not argue, that
Kuntrell had participated in or intended the killing in any way.68 The only
60. See id. (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(c)(2) (1998)). The Arkansas statute reads in
relevant part:
A prosecuting attorney may charge a juvenile in either the juvenile or criminal
division of circuit court when a case involves a juvenile:
(2) Fourteen (14) or fifteen (15) years old when he or she engages in conduct that,
if committed by an adult, would be: (A) Capital murder, § 5-10-101; (B) Murder
in the first degree, § 5-10-102 . . . .
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(c)(2) (1998).
61. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461.
62. Id.; Jackson v. State, No. 02–535, 2003 WL 193412, at *1 (Ark. App. Jan. 29, 2003)
(quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(g) (2002), which lists the statutory factors a trial judge must
consider upon a motion to transfer or retain jurisdiction of a juvenile) (reviewing and affirming the
circuit judge’s decision to deny Jackson’s motion to transfer to juvenile court).
63. Jackson, 2003 WL 193412, at *2. Other statutory factors the court considered included a
psychiatric report concluding that Kuntrell had no psychiatric impairment, and testimony by a
juvenile intake officer that no rehabilitation program existed for Kuntrell if convicted of capital
murder. Id. at *1; see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461. Under Arkansas law, a circuit court’s decision
as to whether to transfer a juvenile is reversed only for clear error. Jackson, 2003 WL 193412, at
*1–2.
64. See Jackson, 2003 WL 193412, at *1.
65. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461.
66. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-10-101(a)(1)(B) (2011).
67. Id.; see also Jackson v. State, 194 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Ark. 2004).
68. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468; Jackson, 194 S.W.3d at 760. In his concurring opinion in
Miller, Justice Breyer points out that the State was not required even to prove that Kuntrell acted
with “extreme indifference,” but only that either one of his accomplices acted with extreme
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evidence that could have suggested that Kuntrell had any intent to
participate in the murder was the disputed statement Kuntrell made before
Shields shot the clerk.69 Had the state been required to prove Kuntrell’s
intent to participate in the killing, this evidence would almost certainly
have been insufficient to prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt.
Based instead on his role in the attempted robbery, Kuntrell was convicted
of capital murder, and under the Arkansas statute70 the judge had no choice
but to sentence him to life imprisonment without parole.71 Neither the fact
that he was fourteen years old nor the fact that he did not kill the victim
could be considered as mitigating circumstances to change this unduly
harsh outcome.72 The Arkansas Supreme Court refused to extend
Graham’s holding to Kuntrell’s case and affirmed his sentence.73 Before
the Supreme Court intervened in Miller, it appeared that Kuntrell’s
decision to rob a video store with two older boys at the age of fourteen left
him without any foreseeable future; he had been decided forever
irredeemable by the State of Arkansas.
Yet it is difficult to argue that Kuntrell Jackson is any more culpable
than Terrence Graham, who received the same sentence for breaking the
terms of his parole and committing an armed burglary.74 In that incident,
Graham had forcibly entered the victim’s home with two older
accomplices.75 Inside, he held a pistol to the victim’s chest, and all three
boys barricaded the victim and his friend inside a closet before leaving and
indifference to the value of human life. 132 S. Ct. at 2477 (Breyer, J., concurring).
69. See supra note 59 and accompanying text; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2477 (Breyer, J.,
concurring). The Arkansas statute provides an affirmative offense for capital felony murder if the
defendant can prove that he did not commit the homicide “or in any way solicit, command, induce,
procure, counsel, or aid in its commission.” Id. (majority opinion) (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 510-101(b) (Repl.1997)). The jury did not grant Kuntrell this affirmative offense, apparently
crediting Booker’s pretrial statement over the testimony at trial. See Jackson, 194 S.W.3d at 760.
70. The statute reads in relevant part:
However, if the state waives the death penalty, stipulates that no aggravating
circumstance exists, or stipulates that mitigating circumstances outweigh
aggravating circumstances, then: (i) No hearing under subdivision (3)(A) of this
section is required; and (ii) The trial court shall sentence the defendant to life
imprisonment without parole.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602(3)(B) (Repl. 2006).
71. See Jackson v. Norris, 378 S.W.3d 103, 107 (2011) (Brown, J., concurring) (citing ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-4-602(3)(B) (Repl. 2006), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), rev’d and remanded
sub nom., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). Because the Supreme Court banned the death
penalty for juveniles in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005), life imprisonment without
parole was statutorily mandated by Kuntrell’s conviction in Alabama.
72. Jackson, 378 S.W.3d at 106–07 (Brown, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 106.
74. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2019–20 (2010).
75. Id. at 2018.
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allegedly attempting a second robbery where one of his accomplices was
shot.76 If anything, Kuntrell is less culpable than Graham. Unlike Graham,
he did not hold a gun or any other weapon during the attempted robbery;
nor was he aware that his accomplice carried a gun until moments before
the robbery.77 And he did not use any violence against the video store
clerk.78 When compared to Graham’s case and the Supreme Court’s
holding that Graham can never be condemned to die in prison for a violent
crime he committed days before his eighteenth birthday,79 the possibility
that Kuntrell Jackson should ever be sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole makes little sense. The facts of Kuntrell’s case—
including his troubled background and the fact that he was fourteen years
old when he committed his crime—show that he is not “among the worst
offenders.”80 How then, did he receive the most severe punishment
available to juvenile defendants—a punishment intended for dangerous
adult offenders and one that reflects a complete departure from the goals of
the juvenile justice system?
II. REDEMPTION OR RETRIBUTION? THE EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE
PUNISHMENT
Until the late nineteenth century, child offenders in the United States
over the age of fifteen were tried as adults,81 and children twelve and
younger were subjected to criminal prosecutions resembling those for
adults.82 Much like children tried in the adult system today, child offenders
faced all of the penalties that adult offenders faced.83 This Part sketches the
evolution of the juvenile justice system in the United States from one
intended to end the practice of treating juveniles as adults in order to
rehabilitate them, to one that allows children like Kuntrell Jackson to be
tried as adults and condemned to die in prison.

76. Id. at 2018–19. Although the judge did not explicitly sentence Graham to life
imprisonment without parole, his sentence of life was statutorily mandated because Florida had
abolished parole. Id. at 2020 (citing FLA. STAT. § 921.002(1)(e) (2003)). At oral argument, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg suggested that this sentence was particularly shocking because “it was far
beyond what the prosecutor recommended.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 33–34, Graham v.
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08–7412).
77. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2461 (2012).
78. Id.
79. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
80. Id. at 2025.
81. THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 14.
82. Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
143, 145 (2003).
83. Id.
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A. Recognizing that Juveniles are Different: Reform in the Progressive
Era
By the end of the nineteenth century, social reformers inspired by the
Progressive movement84 advocated a more enlightened approach to
juvenile justice85 premised on the notion that children’s great potential for
rehabilitation should guide any system holding them accountable for
criminal acts.86 This new paradigm was founded on an understanding that
juvenile offenders lacked the developmental maturity to make informed
judgments and to distinguish right from wrong, undermining the retributive
and deterrence justifications for traditional punishment.87 Although
scholars have pointed out that this view of children tended to be overly
simplistic,88 reformers’ contention that juveniles were “more likely to
benefit from treatment and intervention” than from harsh punishment and
long incarceration89 is supported by modern empirical research.90
By the first quarter of the twentieth century, all but two states had
established separate juvenile courts.91 The objective of the juvenile system
was to develop “open-ended, informal, and highly flexible policies” aimed
at rehabilitating juveniles to become productive citizens.92 In this way,
juvenile courts were developed as a clear alternative to adult, retributive
justice.93 What emerged was a system for child offenders based on the
84. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, A Century of Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a
Revolution that Failed?, 34 N. KY. L. REV.189, 193 (2007) [hereinafter A Century of Juvenile
Justice].
85. Id. at 191–93.
86. See, e.g., THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 14; Elizabeth Cauffman, et al.,
Justice for Juveniles: New Perspectives on Adolescents’ Competence and Culpability, 18 Q.L.R.
403, 403 (1999); Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacaro, Juvenile Justice: The Fourth Option,
95 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8 (2009) (“The rehabilitative vision strongly informed the very first juvenile
court.”); Taylor-Thompson, supra note 82, at 146.
87. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 143–44 (1998).
88. See, e.g., Slobogin & Fondacaro, supra note 86, at 3; Taylor-Thompson, supra note 82, at
146 (explaining that the “persuasive power” of reformers’ “strategy seemed to depend on selectively
invoking images that emphasized—and at times exaggerated—the child-like characteristics of
young offenders”).
89. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 82, at 146.
90. Six empirical studies show that juveniles convicted of violent offenses in criminal court
have significantly higher recidivism rates as compared to similar offenders adjudicated in juvenile
court. RICHARD E. REDDING, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE TRANSFER LAWS: AN EFFECTIVE
DETERRENT TO DELINQUENCY? 4 (2010), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp1220595.
pdf.
91. THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 14.
92. Id. at 14 (quoting Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense:
Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 474 (1987)).
93. A Century of Juvenile Justice, supra note 84, at 189, 193; Timothy J. Pillari, Rethinking
Juvenile Justice: Catholic Social Thought as a Vehicle for Reform, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 167, 167–68 (2008).
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notion of parens patria:94 the state’s role in addressing delinquent children
was not to punish them for past acts, but to protect them and mold them
with each child’s best interests in mind, a determination to be made at the
court’s discretion.95
For the next fifty years, most juvenile courts had exclusive jurisdiction
of child offenders under the age of eighteen.96 This system turned out to
have significant shortcomings. First, because these courts were understood
to function according to the best interests of any child under their
jurisdiction, substantive standards and procedural protections—including
due process—were seen as an unnecessary.97 Second, while most child
offenders were kept out of the adult system, they could be transferred to
adult court if a judge determined that it was in the “best interests” of both
the public and the child to do so.98 This gave judges wide authority to
intervene in the lives of juvenile offenders’ in inconsistent and often
intrusive ways.99
B. Return to Retribution
1. Gault, the Implementation of Due Process, and the Return to an
Adult Model of Retributive Justice
Public concern over abuse of wide judicial discretion in juvenile courts
led the Supreme Court to intervene in the 1960s by requiring more formal
procedure within the juvenile system.100 In the landmark case In re
Gault,101 the Court rejected the doctrine of parens patriae as valid
justification for the denial of due process and implemented many
procedural rights previously regarded as unnecessary for the juvenile
system.102 In poignant language, the majority stated that “[u]nder our
94. A Century of Juvenile Justice, supra note 84, at 189; Slobogin & Fondacaro, supra note
86, at 9.
95. A Century of Juvenile Justice, supra note 84, at 189.
96. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS
AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 94 (2006).
97. Id. at 96.
98. Id. at 94. See also THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 14.
99. See Judge Jay D. Blitzman, Gault’s Promise, 9 BARRY L. REV. 67, 69 & n.17, 79–80
(2007).
100. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 96, at 96. Judge Blitzman explains that “[s]helters and
houses of refuge [for juvenile defendants] had ‘devolved’ in many jurisdictions into locked training
schools and places of detention.” Blitzman, supra note 99, at 69.
101. 387 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1967). The defendant in Gault was judged delinquent in juvenile court
for making “lewd remarks” in a prank call, id. at 4. In a hearing devoid of procedure or reference to
substantive law, he was committed to a reformatory institution until the age of 21. Id.
102. Id. at 17–21. The Court noted that an adult facing similar charges would have faced a fine
of $5 to $50 and “imprisonment in jail for not more than 2 months.” Id. at 69. The Court held that
Due Process requirements attach to juvenile proceedings and that Gault’s proceedings clearly
offended these standards. Id. at 4, 13. Specifically, it held that in proceedings in which a juvenile is
judged delinquent and which may result in commitment to a state institution, id. at 13, a juvenile

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss3/4

14

Shitama: Bringing our Children Back from the Land of Nod: Why the Eighth A

2013]

BRINGING OUR CHILDREN BACK FROM THE LAND OF NOD

827

Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo
court.”103 The Court explained that “[t]he absence of substantive standards
has not necessarily meant that children receive careful, compassionate,
individualized treatment,” the primary objectives of the juvenile system,
but instead that “[d]epartures from established principles of due process
have frequently resulted . . . in arbitrariness.”104
Professor Kim Taylor-Thompson, of the New York University School
of Law, has aptly pointed out that in implementing procedures formerly
reserved for adult offenders, the Supreme Court did not seek to “re-orient
the therapeutic bent of the juvenile justice system to match the punitive
goals of the adult system.”105 Rather, the majority in Gault applauded the
separate juvenile system’s objectives to treat, rehabilitate, and care for
juvenile offenders as an alternative to harsh, adult punishment.106 As such,
the Court explained that it did not intend to undermine these
“commendable principles” by requiring procedural protections within that
system.107
Unfortunately, as Professor Taylor-Thompson has argued and other
scholars have suggested, “Gault’s legacy may be more complicated than
the Court ever appreciated.”108 Gault marked the beginning of an ironic
shift in juvenile justice: it was intended to protect the integrity of a separate
juvenile system by borrowing necessary procedural safeguards from the
adult system.109 But the more the juvenile system has taken on elements of
the adult system, the more it has synthesized with it, and “the more
difficult the task has become to distinguish between adolescents and adults
in any meaningful way or to justify the continued existence of a separate
system of adjudication for youths.”110 In this way, Gault opened the door to
treating juveniles like adults.111 This synthesis has resulted in what the
Supreme Court described in Gault as “the worst of both worlds,” where the
“child [offender] . . . gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the
has the right to notice, id. at 33, to counsel, id. at 41, to protection against self-incrimination, id. at
55, to question witnesses, id. at 57, and to appellate review, id. at 58.
103. Id. at 28.
104. Id. at 18–19.
105. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 82, at 147.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 15–16, 27. Specifically, it commended the separate juvenile system’s objective to
treat, rehabilitate, and care for juvenile offenders as an alternative to harsh, adult punishment. Id.
108. Id. at 147. See also, e.g., Blitzman, supra note 99, at 67–68.
109. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 18–19.
110. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 82, at 147.
111. Id. (“Extension of adult-like constitutional status may have contributed to the perception
that courts could treat adolescents as adults. That courts should treat adolescents as adults then
deceptively seemed only a small step. Particularly given the common perception that violent crime
warrants more severe sanctions than would likely issue in juvenile court, distinctions between
juvenile and adult sentencing have come to appear anachronistic.”).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 4

828

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.”112
2. The 1980s and the Myth of the Juvenile Super-Predator
While Gault inadvertently suggested a departure from rehabilitative
ideals, public fear over the steep increase in violent juvenile crime in the
1980s explicitly accelerated this departure.113 Gun homicides by
adolescents rose sharply in the mid 1980s, fell after 1993, and then
stabilized.114 Although this increase in juvenile crime did not last, it was
met with widespread public panic, coinciding with the escalation of the
“War on Drugs” and a political climate of increased criminalization.115
Policy makers flooded the public discourse with dire predictions of
juvenile crime sprees and the imminent proliferation of delinquent juvenile
criminals—in particular, juvenile criminals of color.116 Then Princeton
University Professor John DiIulio popularized the term “super-predator,”
spinning a lurid, racially-colored image in countless national publications
of inner-city streets crawling with these remorseless, amoral juveniles.117
DiIulio made a dramatic forecast that “by the year 2010, there will be
112. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 18 n.23 (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966)).
Ironically, this is due in part to the Court’s own decision in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528, 545 (1971), just four years after Gault, in which it held that jury trials are not constitutionally
required in juvenile courts (although states are authorized to implement them). Thirty-one states
have since passed laws proscribing any right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings. NAT’L CTR. FOR
JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE DELINQUENTS’ RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 1 (2007), available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/2008_right_to_jury_snapshot.pdf.
113. See, e.g., THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 15; Taylor-Thompson, supra note
82, at 148.
114. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS CRIME DATA BRIEF, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2002 UPDATE 2 (2002), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus02.pdf. In
1984, there were just under 1,000 arrests for juvenile homicide. Id. This number peaked with 3,284
arrests in 1993, declined to 919 arrests by 1999, and stabilized with 956 arrests in 2006. UNIV. OF
VA., CURRY SCHOOL OF EDUC., YOUTH VIOLENCE PROJECT: SCHOOL VIOLENCE MYTHS,
http://curry.virginia.edu/research/projects/violence-in-schools/school-violence-myths (last visited
Mar. 13, 2013).
115. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 96, at 96. In 1983, then President Ronald Reagan
signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 21 U.S.C.A. § 801 (1986), appropriating $1.7 billion to
fight the drug war, and creating mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses.
116. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 82, at 148.
117. See, e.g., John J. DiIulio, Jr., My Black Crime Problem, and Ours, CITY J., Spring 1996,
available at http://www.city-journal.org/html/6_2_my_black.html (“[N]ot only is the number of
young black criminals likely to surge, but also the black crime rate . . . is increasing, so that as many
as half of these juvenile super-predators could be young black males.”); John J. DiIulio, Jr., The
Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 1, available at
http://cooley.libarts.wsu.edu/schwartj/criminology/dilulio.pdf (“On the horizon . . . are tens of
thousands of severely morally impoverished juvenile super-predators. They are perfectly capable of
committing the most heinous acts of physical violence for the most trivial reasons. . . . They live by
the meanest code . . . that reinforces rather than restrains their violent, hair-trigger
mentality . . . . [F]or as long as their youthful energies hold out, they will do what comes ‘naturally’:
murder, rape, rob, assault, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, and get high.”).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss3/4

16

Shitama: Bringing our Children Back from the Land of Nod: Why the Eighth A

2013]

BRINGING OUR CHILDREN BACK FROM THE LAND OF NOD

829

270,000 more juvenile super-predators on the streets than there were in
1990.”118 This widespread, sensationalist discourse painted a vivid picture
in the public’s mind of delinquent children so dangerous and wayward that
traditional notions of juveniles as inherently less culpable and more
amenable to rehabilitation were no longer palatable.119
Today it is clear that this panic was unfounded.120 John DiIulio himself,
as one of the amici who submitted a brief on behalf of Kuntrell Jackson,121
has discredited his super-predator discourse as a myth and “expressed
regret, acknowledging that the prediction was never fulfilled.”122 Still,
public fear of juvenile crime propelled a monumental shift in this nation’s
approach to juvenile justice, and has resulted in the increasingly punitive
adjudication of children that fails to differentiate them from their adult
counterparts. This shift has all but vitiated the fundamental principle of
rehabilitation underlying a separate system of juvenile justice.123
C. Beyond Redemption: Sending “Throwaway” Children into the Adult
Criminal Justice System
“You say the sanctity of human life, but you’re dealing with a 14-year-old
being sentenced to life in prison, so he will die in prison without any hope.
I mean, essentially, you’re making a 14-year-old throwaway person.”124
1. Adjudicating Children in Adult Court
The increase in juvenile crime beginning in the 1980s and the resulting
panic sparked an unprecedented legislative response from almost all fifty
states in the 1990s.125 The public abandoned its previous concern over the
abuse of discretion and arbitrary treatment within juvenile courts pre-

118. John DiIulio, How to Stop the Coming Crime Wave, 1 (New York: Manhattan Institute,
1996)).
119. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 82, at 148–49. As Professor Taylor-Thompson points
out, racial stigmatization of young black males was particularly contagious. Id. Beginning in the
early 1980s, a dramatic disparity grew between the relative percentage of black and white juveniles
admitted to adult prisons. See THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 15.
120. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
121. Brief of Jeffrey Fagan, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners Jackson and Miller
at 19, 30, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No. 10-9646), ECF No. 29 (the amici argue
that the super-predator myth has turned out to be completely unsubstantiated by scientific and
empirical evidence, and that empirical studies show that the increasing incarceration and ratcheted
sentences that followed are “not causally responsible for the decline in juvenile homicide rates.”)
122. Id. at 19.
123. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 96, at 96.
124. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2012) (No. 10–9647)
(Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg).
125. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 4

830

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

Gault,126 and replaced it with the sentiment that existing criminal laws for
juveniles were too lenient.127 Incited by the public’s moral panic,
legislators capitalized on phrases such as “adult time for adult crime.”128
States began a decades-long trend of vastly expanding juvenile transfer
laws.129 These laws enable states to try juveniles in adult court,130 and to
sentence juveniles beyond the upper age of juvenile court jurisdiction,
which is set at twenty-one in most states.131 By 1997, forty-seven states had
adopted transfer laws.132 Currently, every state has at least one form of
juvenile transfer, and most states have multiple ways of imposing adult
sanctions on juvenile offenders.133 There are three main mechanisms for
transferring juveniles to adult court,134 and forty-four states impose some
form of mandatory waiver.135 Many of these laws have “shift[ed]
decisionmaking authority from judges to prosecutors, and replace[d]
individualized discretion with automatic and categorical mechanisms.”136
The Supreme Court in Miller noted that of the twenty-nine jurisdictions
that impose mandatory life without parole on juveniles, “about half” have
mandatory transfer laws that “place at least some juvenile homicide
offenders in adult court automatically, with no apparent opportunity to seek
transfer [back] to juvenile court.”137 Juveniles are therefore often
126. See supra Part II.B.
127. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 82, at 147.
128. See THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 2, 16. See also THE LIVES OF JUVENILE
LIFERS, supra note 14, at 6.
129. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND REPORTING 8 (2011)
[hereinafter STATE TRANSFER LAWS].
130. Id. at 8.
131. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 96, at 103.
132. THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 16–17. According to SNYDER & SICKMUND,
supra note 96, at 96–97, between 1992 and 1997 forty-five states changed their laws to enable the
transfer of juvenile offenders to adult court; thirteen states adopted or modified statutes that
imposed mandatory periods of incarceration for juveniles convicted of certain crimes; forty-seven
states changed confidentiality provisions making records more widely available to the public; and
twenty-two states passed laws increasing victims’ rights in juvenile crimes.
133. STATE TRANSFER LAWS, supra note 129, at 2.
134. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 96, at 110. First, judicial waiver is common to the most
states and gives judges authority to waive juvenile jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 110.
Second, mandatory statutory exclusion provisions require that juveniles of a certain age or charged
with certain offenses—including those tried with felony murder—be tried in adult court. Id. at 113–
14. This is the most commonly used form of transfer. Id. Finally, direct file or prosecutorial
discretion provisions like the Arkansas statute in Kuntrell’s case, allow prosecutors to file juvenile
cases in either juvenile or adult court. Id. at 110.
135. STATE TRANSFER LAWS, supra note 129, at 2–3. The three forms of mandatory waiver are
mandatory judicial waiver, statutory exclusion, and once an adult, always an adult laws, which
require criminal prosecution of any juvenile who has previously been tried as an adult. Id.
136. Id. at 9.
137. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2474 (2012).
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transferred to adult court with little or no consideration of their child status
or the mitigating circumstances surrounding their offense.138
Regardless of the mechanism, once a child is transferred to criminal
court, “the features that distinguish [children] from adults . . . put[s the
child] at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings.”139 Children
often “mistrust adults and have limited understandings of the criminal
justice system,”140 and are ill-equipped to “deal with police officers or
prosecutors (including on a plea agreement),” or to aid their lawyers in
their own defense.141 Once convicted in adult court, mandatory sentencing
laws proscribe age and other mitigating factors from weighing in the
determination of a child offender’s punishment, resulting in the sentencing
of children such as Kuntrell Jackson to life in prison without the possibility
of parole. This outcome “ignores that [these children] might have been
charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies
associated with youth.”142
2. A Misguided Approach
“In uncertainty I am certain that underneath their topmost layers of frailty
men want to be good and want to be loved. Indeed, most of their vices are
attempted short cuts to love. When a man comes to die, no matter what his
talents and influence and genius, if he dies unloved his life must be a
failure to him and his dying a cold horror.”143
It is unfortunate that society has deviated so far in its treatment of child
offenders that thousands of children who commit criminal acts are no
longer deemed worthy of empathy, compassion, or redemption. Although
there has been a steady decline in juvenile crime since 1994, there has been
no measurable attempt among states to reconsider the draconian shift in
juvenile adjudication.144 While research shows that the public generally
supports prosecuting juveniles in adult court, the public “does not favor
giving juveniles full adult sentences, placing them in adult correctional
facilities, or abandoning rehabilitative goals.”145 This may be because
138. The Miller majority noted that “[e]ven when States give transfer-stage discretion to
judges, it has limited utility,” because “the decisionmaker typically will have only partial
information at this early, pretrial stage about either the child or the circumstances of his offense”
and “the question at transfer hearings may differ dramatically from the issue at post-trial
sentencing.” Id.
139. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010).
140. Id. at 2032.
141. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012).
142. Id.
143. JOHN STEINBECK, EAST OF EDEN 412–13 (John Steinbeck Centennial ed. 1902–2002,
Penguin Books 1952).
144. STATE TRANSFER LAWS, supra note 129, at 9.
145. See Erin Flynn, Dismantling the Felony-Murder Rule: Juvenile Deterrence and
Retribution Post-Roper v. Simmons, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1049, 1059 (2008) (citing DAVID L.
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many people believe that some children should be punished more harshly
than juvenile jurisdiction allows, but do not realize that there is little
middle ground, and that states have created an all-or-nothing system: those
juveniles prosecuted in adult court are often sentenced and incarcerated
without any consideration of their juvenile status.
Still, proponents of harsh sanctions might be tempted to argue that the
decline in juvenile crime since the 1990s is a direct result of draconian
penological treatment and increased incarceration of juveniles since the
1980s.146 However, criminologists caution that it is incorrect to assume
that changes in the crime rate are a direct correlation of changes in penal
policy or punishment.147 More concretely, empirical studies suggest that
the sweeping legislative changes and accompanying increases in juvenile
incapacitation “were not casually responsible for the decline in juvenile
homicide rates” or other serious crime that occurred in the mid 1990s.148
Moreover, research suggests that public safety is not served by the
permanent incapacitation of child offenders. Nueroscience shows that they
will grow and mature in ways that will increase their ability to make
reasoned decisions and to regulate their impulse control,149 and numerous
longitudinal studies show that as a result of this process the majority of
MEYERS, BOYS AMONG MEN: TRYING AND SENTENCING JUVENILES AS ADULTS 4, 9–10, 127 (2005)).
146. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Social Welfare and Fairness in Juvenile Crime
Regulation, 71 LA. L. REV. 35, 51 (2010).
147. Id.
148. Brief of Jeffrey Fagan, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 121, at
30–34 (citing RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, NO PLACE FOR KIDS: THE CASE
FOR REDUCING JUVENILE INCARCERATION 26 (2011)); David McDowall & Simon I. Singer,
Criminalizing Delinquency: The Deterrent Effects of the New York Juvenile Offender Law, 22 LAW
AND SOC’Y REV. 521 (1988); Eric L. Jensen & Linda K. Metsger, A Test of the Deterrent Effect of
Legislative Waiver on Violent Juvenile Crime, 40 CRIME AND DELINQ. 96 (1994)). The authors
explain that empirical studies show that jurisdictions with higher juvenile incarceration rates have
not had greater decreases in juvenile crime, and that jurisdictions that have greatly reduced their
juvenile incarceration rates have not had increases in juvenile crime. Id. Similarly, the rate at which
states imposed juvenile life without parole has not shown any correlation to juvenile homicide rates
during the 1980s and 1990s, which was consistent across the states. Id. at 32–33.
149. See Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV.
CLINICAL PYSCHOL. 459, 466 (2009). Steinberg explains that “risky behavior in adolescence is the
product of the interaction between two distinct neurobiological systems,” a “socioemotional
system” in the limbic and paralimbic areas of the brain, and a “cognitive control system,” in the
lateral prefontal and parietal cortices. Id. Adolescence is marked “by a rapid and dramatic increase
in dopaminergic activity within the socioemotional system around the time of puberty, which is
presumed to lead to increases in reward seeking.” Id. Unlike adults, however, adolescents do not yet
have “the structural maturation of the cognitive control system and its connections to areas of the
socioemotional system,” or the ability to exercise judgment to temper this heightened degree of risktaking. Id. Steinberg explains that this is “a maturational process that is gradual, unfolds over the
course of adolescence, and permits more advanced self- regulation and impulse control.” Id. This
gap in development “creates a period of heightened vulnerability to risk taking during middle
adolescence.” Id. One writer has characterized this process as similar to “starting the engines
without a skilled driver behind the wheel.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
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child offenders will desist all criminal behavior.150 As the sobering process
of maturation inevitably occurs,151 these individuals will likely feel deep
regret for what they did and attempt to redefine themselves not by their
painful adolescent transgressions, but by their potential as mature,
discerning adults.152 And even though almost any rational person can
recognize the illogic of defining someone by their worst adolescent
decisions and acts, a sentence of life without parole means that none of
these considerations matter.153
Although the Court in Miller declined to categorically prohibit a
sentence of life without parole for juveniles, Miller does prohibit a
sentencer from failing to consider a juvenile’s child status “in imposing a
State’s harshest penalties.”154 The majority explained that in light of
“children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for
change . . . appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles” to life without
the possibility of parole “will be uncommon.”155 Therefore, even if states
continue to adjudicate certain juvenile offenders in adult court in order to
punish them more harshly than the juvenile system permits, current Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence demands that the majority of these children be
given a second chance. Part III sketches this jurisprudence to show how the
Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishment to scale back the adult punishment of children.
III. JUVENILE PUNISHMENT AND CURRENT EIGHTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Eighth Amendment Framework
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment
protects individuals from excessive sanctions by ensuring that punishment
for a crime is proportionate to both the offense committed and the
150. See, e.g., id. at 478 (explaining that according to most studies only 5%–10% of child
offenders become chronic offenders); Taylor-Thompson, supra note 82, at 156 (citing John H. Laub
& Robert J. Sampson, Understanding Desistance from Crime, 28 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2001); Terrie E.
Moffitt, Adolescent-Limited and Life-Course Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental
Taxonomy, 100 PYSCHOL. REV. 674, 675–77 (1993); Neal Shover & Carol Y. Thompson, Age,
Differential Expectations, and Crime Desistance, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 89 (1992)).
151. See supra note 146.
152. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010) (“Maturity can lead to that
considered reflection which is the foundation for remorse, renewal, and re-habilitation.”); see also
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (“Deciding that a ‘juvenile offender will forever be a
danger to society’ would require ‘making a judgment that he is incorrigible—but ‘incorrigibility is
inconsistent with youth.’”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. Tragically, the sentence also eliminates any incentive for these children to transform
themselves into responsible, productive individuals, because they know they have no hope of
reentering society. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.
154. Id. at 2468.
155. Id. at 2469.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 4

834

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

characteristics of the offender.156 The Court views this concept of
proportionality not through “a historical prism” but “according to the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”157 The Court has used two approaches to review the
proportionality of sentences to determine whether they constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.158 The first approach is a narrow proportionality
review, or an as-applied challenge to the length of a term of years.159
The second approach is the use of categorical bans, which includes two
lines of precedent addressing the proportionality of punishment.160 The
first line of precedent involves categorical bans on sentences that are
disproportionate because of the nature of the offense or the characteristics
of the offender.161 The Court has banned the imposition of the death
penalty on those convicted of nonhomicide crimes,162 on mentally retarded
defendants,163 and on children.164 Also included in this line of cases is
Graham, in which the Court likened juvenile life without parole to a
sentence of death.165 The second line of precedent involves those cases in
which the Court has prohibited the mandatory imposition of capital
punishment, and required that a sentencer—in deciding whether to impose
death—consider any mitigating evidence a defendant presents regarding

156. Id. at 2463.
157. Id. at 2464 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) and Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). Chief Justice Earl Warren first articulated this standard in Trop v. Dulles:
“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man. . . . The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.” 356 U.S. at 100–01.
158. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021.
159. Id. The Supreme Court has rarely invalidated individual sentences on this “narrow
proportionality principle,” which “forbids only extreme sentences . . . ‘grossly disproportionate’ to
the crime.” See id. at 2022 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991), in which the
Court upheld a sentence of life without parole for a defendant convicted of possession of cocaine).
160. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012).
161. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.
162. Id. (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2660 (2008) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment forbids capital punishment “for the rape of a child where the crime did not result, and
was not intended to result, in the death of the victim”); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)
(holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids capital punishment for felony murder where the
defendant “does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place”); and Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that capital punishment is “grossly disproportionate
and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment . . .”)).
163. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574
(2005), the Court relied heavily on its reasoning in Atkins and concluded that juveniles, like those
with diminished mental capacity, are never among the most culpable offenders and are therefore
less deserving of the harshest punishment.
164. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
165. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2046.
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his characteristics and the circumstances surrounding his offense.166 This
rule is meant to ensure that death is reserved for “the most culpable
defendants” who commit “the most serious offenses.”167 Miller is based on
both of these strands of precedent.168
Once it establishes that the adoption of a categorical rule is at issue, the
Court employs an analysis of “evolving standards of decency” to determine
whether the punishment is cruel and unusual. 169 This is a two-part test.170
First, the Court “considers objective indicia of society’s standards, as
expressed in legislative enactments and state practice to determine whether
there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue.”171
Next, “guided by the ‘standards elaborated by controlling precedents and
by the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment’s text, history, meaning and purpose,’”172 the Court must
“determine in the exercise of its own independent judgment whether the
punishment in question” is cruel or unusual.173 This is largely a
proportionality inquiry requiring consideration of “the culpability of the
offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the
severity of the punishment in question.”174 A fundamental aspect of the
Court’s inquiry is its analysis of “whether the challenged sentencing
practice serves penological goals.”175 “A sentence lacking any legitimate

166. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463–64 (2012) (citing Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion) and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)).
167. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467.
168. Id. at 2463–64.
169. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.
170. Id.
171. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This is the “unusual” aspect of the analysis. See
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2477 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices
Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito each wrote dissenting opinions in Miller, in which they
criticized the majority for dispensing with objective indicia and deciding Miller solely on their own
views of what is proportionate. See id. at 2477–78 (“Today, the Court invokes [the Eighth
Amendment] to ban a punishment that the Court does not itself characterize as unusual, and that
could not plausibly be described as such.”); id. at 2486 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2490 (Alito,
J., dissenting) (“What today’s decision shows it that our Eighth Amendment cases are no longer tied
to any objective indicia of society’s standards.”).
172. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650
(2008)).
173. Id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)).
174. Id. (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 568). Although the Supreme Court has recited both steps as
necessary to its proportionality review, see id., it has not clarified whether any particular weight
should be given to either, stating only that “[c]ommunity consensus, while ‘entitled to great
weight,’ is not itself determinative of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.” Id. at 2026
(citing Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2658). Contra Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge
Juvenile Transfer Laws, 71 LA L. REV. 99, 113 (asserting that the Supreme Court “has not clarified
whether one or both prongs must be met before finding the sentence unconstitutional”).
175. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 4

836

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

penological justification is by its nature disproportionate.”176 This Note
focuses on the second part of the Court’s analysis—the proportionality
inquiry—to explain how the Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment
to limit the adult punishment of children.177
B. Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida: Death Is Different, But
Children Are Too
In Roper and Graham, the Supreme Court considered the
proportionality of adult punishment on juvenile offenders, and established
that juveniles are categorically less culpable than adults and “cannot with
reliability be classified among the worst offenders.”178 In both cases, the
Court stated that developmental differences in juveniles make them “less
deserving of the most severe punishments.”179 The Court relied on
nueroscientific research mapping adolescent brain structure, as well as
social science, to articulate three primary reasons for juveniles’ lessened
culpability.180 First, juveniles “lack maturity” and possess “underdeveloped
responsibility,” leading to “impetuous and ill-considered actions and
decisions.” 181 Second, juveniles “are more vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure,” and
“lack the freedom that adults have to extricate themselves from a
criminogenic setting.”182 Third, juveniles have characters that are “not as
well formed” and possess traits (inhibiting their maturity and judgment)
that are more “transitory and less fixed.”183 The Court concluded that all of
these characteristics show that juveniles have a great capacity for change
and rehabilitation.184
In Roper, the Court set aside Christopher Simmons’ death sentence for
the burglary and cold-blooded murder of an older woman, a crime it
described as “outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman.”185
By choosing to grant certiorari in Simmons’ case, the Supreme Court made
176. Id. at 2028.
177. The dissenting opinions in Miller, see supra note 171, show how four justices of the
current Court take issue with this interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. For example, Justices
Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia believe that the Eighth Amendment should be interpreted
according to its “original understanding,” which they believe does not include a “proportionality
principle” of punishment. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2483–84 (2012) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Thomas suggests that any punishment that was not considered cruel and unusual
at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, should not be so considered now. See id. at n.2.
178. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
185. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556.
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a resolute statement that child offenders are fundamentally different from
adults in ways that bear so profoundly on their culpability that no matter
how heinous their crime, they can never be considered among the most
culpable offenders.186 It accordingly imposed a categorical ban, in the case
of juvenile offenders, on death—the most severe punishment for any
offender.187
In Graham, the Court stopped short of fully extending Roper’s logic
when it drew a line between the culpability of juvenile homicide and
nonhomicide offenders and imposed a categorical ban on life without
parole only for the latter.188 The Court found that those juveniles who “do
not kill or intend to kill ha[ve] a twice diminished moral culpability.”189
Next, the Court drew parallels between a sentence of life without parole for
a juvenile offender—the harshest penalty available to a juvenile—and a
sentence of death.190 It explained that although “a death sentence is unique
in its severity and irrevocability,” a sentence of “life without parole
share[s] some characteristics with . . . death . . . that [is] shared by no other
sentence.”191 It recognized that in light of the fundamental differences
between juveniles and adults enumerated in Roper,192 life without parole is
“an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile,” because on average it
causes a juvenile to serve a greater percentage of his life in prison than an
adult; and its complete denial of any hope of redemption is infinitely
harsher in the case of a juvenile.193 Finally, in applying its proportionality
review, the Court found that life without parole does not serve any of the
legitimate penological goals for juvenile nonhomicide offenders—
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.194 It therefore
concluded that the sentence for juveniles convicted of a nonhomicide
offense is “by its nature disproportionate,”195 and is cruel and unusual
under the Eighth Amendment.196
186. See Flynn, supra note 145, at 1054; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
187. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575. The Court explained that “[c]apital punishment must be limited
to those offenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes and whose extreme
culpability makes them the most deserving of execution.” Id. at 568. Roper abrogated Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1988), which held that the death penalty could be imposed on juvenile
offenders between the ages of sixteen and seventeen.
188. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030. In his article Clemency for Our Children, 32 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2641, 2645 (2011), Professor Anthony C. Thompson argued that the Court in Graham
missed the fundamental point of its conclusion that juveniles are categorically less culpable than
adults when it limited its ban on life without parole to those convicted of nonhomicide offenses.
189. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027.
190. Id. at 2027.
191. Id.
192. See supra notes 180–83and accompanying text.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2028–30.
195. Id. at 2028.
196. Id. at 2030.
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Despite Graham’s failure to recognize that constitutional differences
between juveniles and adults are not isolated to those juveniles who
commit nonhomicide offenses, it broke Eighth Amendment ground by
creating the first categorical rule prohibiting a sentence other than death.197
In addition to establishing that death is different for purposes of the Eighth
Amendment and sentencing, the Court in Graham soundly established that
children are different too.
C. Miller v. Alabama: Child-Status and the Death of Mandatory Deathin-Prison Sentences for Children
Just as Graham extended Eighth Amendment categorical bans beyond
the context of capital punishment,198 Miller extends Eighth Amendment
challenges to yet another category of punishment: mandatory sentences
involving a punishment less than death.199 In ruling that sentences of
mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders are
unconstitutional,200 the Court in Miller recognized that “none of what it
said [in Graham] about children—about their distinctive (and transitory
mental) traits and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime specific.”201 At
its core, Miller recognizes that denying any child a chance for
rehabilitation and redemption without consideration of the mitigating
factors attendant to his or her child status, is fundamentally unfair and is
likely to result in disproportionate punishment.202
As noted in Part III.A, to reach its holding, the Miller Court relied on
two lines of Eighth Amendment precedent.203 First, it relied on Roper and
Graham, where the Court applied its Eighth Amendment framework for
categorical bans based on the characteristics of the offender or the nature of
the offense.204 The Court explained that although Graham’s “flat ban”
against juvenile life without parole was explicitly confined to nonhomicide
offenders, the characteristics that make juveniles less culpable than adults
are “evident in the same way, and to the same degree,” when a juvenile
commits a homicide offense, and “Graham’s reasoning implicates any lifewithout-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile.”205 Miller summarized
197. See id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that Graham “eviscerate[d]” the
distinction that “[d]eath is different,” because until Graham “the Court ha[d] based its categorical
proportionality rulings on the notion that the Constitution gives special protection to capital
defendants because the death penalty is a uniquely severe punishment that must be reserved for only
those who are ‘most notably deserving of execution’”).
198. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2046.
199. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012).
200. Id. at 2461.
201. Id. at 2465.
202. See id. at 2465–69.
203. Id. at 2463.
204. Id. at 2463–64.
205. Id. at 2465.
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Roper and Graham as having established “that the distinctive attributes of
youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest
sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible
crimes.”206 It concluded that mandatory life without parole for juveniles
“contravenes Graham’s (and also Roper’s) foundational principle: that
imposition of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot
proceed as though they were not children.”207
Because Graham likened juvenile parole to a sentence of death, Miller
also relied on the Court’s Eighth Amendment precedent requiring
individualized sentencing when imposing capital punishment.208 In
particular, it emphasized that in those cases the Court “insisted . . . that a
sentencer have the ability to consider the ‘mitigating qualities of youth,’”
including the age, background, and mental and emotional development of
child offenders.209 The Court summarized the constitutional shortcomings
of mandatory life without parole:
[It] precludes consideration of [a child’s] chronological age
and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity,
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.
It prevents taking into account the family and home
environment that surrounds [a child]—and from which he
cannot usually extricate himself—not matter how brutal or
dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide
offense, including the extent of his participation in the
conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have
affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been
charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for
incompetencies associated with youth—for example, his
inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including
on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own
attorneys. And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards
the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances
most suggest it.210
Miller mandates that a sentencer “take into account . . . how th[e]se
differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing [children] to a lifetime

206. Id. at 2465. See also id. at 2467 (discussing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115
(1982), in which the Court invalidated a death sentence for the 16-year-old defendant “because the
judge did not consider evidence of [the defendant’s] neglectful and violent family
background . . . and his emotional disturbance”).
207. Id. at 2466.
208. Id. at 2467.
209. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116).
210. Id. at 2468 (citations omitted).
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in prison.”211 The Court noted that “given all [it has] said in Roper,
Graham, and [Miller] about children’s diminished culpability and
heightened capacity for change . . . appropriate occasions for sentencing
juveniles to the harshest penalty will be uncommon.”212 If life without
parole should be “uncommon” for child offenders, and resereved only for
the most culpable of these offenders if it is to be used at all, it follows that
the sentence should never be imposed on juveniles such as Kuntrell
Jackson, who are convicted of accessorial felony murder and do not kill or
intend to kill.
IV. PUNISHING JUVENILES FOR ACCESSORIAL FELONY MURDER
A. Twice Diminished Culpability
In drawing a line between homicide and nonhomicide, the Court in
Graham relied on Eighth Amendment precedent that “defendants who do
not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically
less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment than are
murderers.”213 The Graham majority explained:
Although an offense like robbery or rape is a “serious crime
deserving serious punishment,” those crimes differ from
homicide crimes in a moral sense. It follows that, when
compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who does
not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral
culpability. The age of the offender and the nature of the
crime each bear on the analysis.214
Justice Stephen Breyer, in his concurring opinion in Miller joined by
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, argued that “the Eighth Amendment as
interpreted in Graham forbids sentencing [Kuntrell] Jackson to [life
without parole], regardless of whether its application is mandatory or
discretionary under state law.”215 Justice Breyer explained that “given
Graham’s reasoning, the kinds of homicide that can subject a juvenile
offender to life without parole must exclude instances where the juvenile
himself neither kills nor intends to kill the victim,” because “[q]uite
simply,” he “lacks ‘twice diminished’ responsibility.”216

211. Id. at 2469.
212. Id.
213. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641,
2659–60 (2008); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 799 (1982); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137
(1987); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
214. Id. at 2027 (emphasis added) (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797).
215. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (Breyer, J., concurring).
216. Id. at 2475–76.
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Indeed, this language from Graham tracks the Court’s language in
Enmund v. Florida,217 in which it held that the Eighth Amendment forbids
capital punishment for a defendant who “aids and abets a felony in the
course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself
kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force
will be employed.”218 In Enmund, the Court concluded that the death
penalty should be reserved for the most culpable offenders (those who
intentionally take a human life), and that a defendant convicted of felony
murder who does not kill or intend to kill does not fall within this
category.219 By the Court’s own logic, if adults who do not kill or intend to
kill are not morally deserving of the harshest sentence available to
adults,220 then it follows that juveniles who do not kill or intend to kill are
not morally deserving of the harshest sentence available to juveniles.

217. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). The defendant, Earl Enmund, was the driver of the getaway car for a
robbery in which two people were killed by his accomplice. Id. at 784, 788.
218. Id. at 797.
219. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798, 801. Five years later in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 135,
158 (1987), the Court allowed the death penalty to be applied to two aiders and abettors who were
“actively involved in every element of the kidnapping-robbery” underlying their felony murder
conviction, and showed “reckless indifference to human life” through their participation in this
crime. The petitioners in Tison were two brothers who brought guns into a prison and armed and
freed their father and his prison mate, both of whom were previously convicted of murder. Id. at
139. In the subsequent escape, they assisted their father and his prison mate in flagging down a
passing car; robbed the passengers; held them at gunpoint while their father decided what to do with
them; and stood by while their father and his prison mate shot them. Id. at 151–52. One of the
brothers also admitted that “he was prepared to kill in furtherance of the prison break.” Id. at 152.
The Court narrowed the rule in Enmund by holding that some accomplices convicted of felony
murder who do not kill or intend to kill, but who exhibit reckless disregard for human life through
their active involvement in the underlying felony, may be culpable enough to justify the death
penalty. In doing so, the Court at best muddied what was a clear rule in Enmund and at worst
undermined Enmund’s reasoning. However, as Justice Breyer pointed out in Miller, 132 S. Ct. at
2476, “even juveniles who meet the Tison standard of ‘reckless disregard’” should not be sentenced
to life without parole because the Court in Graham specifically stated that juveniles “who do not
kill or intend to kill ha[ve] twice diminished moral culpability.” Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027. The
Court in Graham did not qualify this statement with a reference to the heightened culpability of
those juveniles who exhibit reckless disregard for human life. See id. Graham therefore “dictates a
clear rule” prohibiting the imposition of life without parole on these juveniles. See Miller, 132 S.
Ct. at 2476.
220. See Rosen, supra note 43, at 1116–17 (“[T]he possibility always exists that, with the
felony murder rule as a basis for a capital sentence, some minimally culpable felony murder
defendants, like accidental killers or attenuated accomplices to the felony, will be sentenced to die,
even while many cold-blooded premeditated killers will be allowed to live. This possibility hardly
reflects the proportionality—the reservation of the death penalty for the worst murderers—that
underlies the Court’s entire eighth amendment venture.”).
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B. The Doctrine of Felony Murder
The fundamental differences between juveniles and adults discussed in
Roper, Graham, and Miller221 call into question the propriety of ever
applying the felony-murder rule to juveniles.222 But assuming that states
continue to prosecute juvenile offenders for felony murder, Graham makes
clear that the Eighth Amendment forbids sentencing them to life in prison
without the possibility of parole.
1. Homicide Without the Necessary Mental State
Felony murder is a form of strict liability at its most extreme. Strict
liability imposes criminal liability for an action without proof of intent—or
mens rea—to commit the action.223 The doctrine of felony murder imposes
liability for murder where a defendant engages in a felonious act or
attempts to engage in a felonious act and someone dies as a result.224
Unlike other homicide offenses, there is no independent mens rea
requirement for accessorial felony murder. Instead, the intent to commit the
underlying felony satisfies the requisite intent to kill, and a defendant can
be charged with and convicted of murder even if he did not kill or intend to
kill the victim.225 This is often referred to as “transferred intent.”226 Felony
murder therefore ignores the fundamental principle of criminal justice: that
“a culpable mental state . . . is a necessary component of moral
blameworthiness, and thus, a requirement for criminal punishment.”227
221. See supra Part IV.
222. See Flynn, supra note 145, at 1053–54 (arguing that the justification for felony murder
“runs afoul” of the Court’s conclusions about juveniles’ lessened culpability in Roper, and that
felony murder charges “should be categorically excluded as applied to juveniles”).
223. See Assaf Hamdani, Mens Rea and the Cost of Ignorance, 93 VA. L. REV. 415, 416
(2007).
224. Rudolph J. Gerber, The Felony Murder Rule: Conundrum Without Principle, 31 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 763, 763 (1999). The common example of felony murder is Kuntrell Jackson’s case, where the
underlying felony is robbery during which an accomplice causes the victim’s death. See supra Part
I.
225. See Steven A. Drizin & Allison McGown Keegan, Abolishing the Use of the FelonyMurder Rule When the Defendant Is a Teenager, 28 NOVA L. REV. 507, 527 (2004); Gerber, supra
note 224, at 770–71 (“[T]he rule ignores the felon’s true state of mind and, in its place, concocts a
homicidal mental state from evidence of a felonious mental state less culpable than homicide. [It]
transfers the intent to commit a felony to the death even if the death is accidental and
unanticipated.”).
226. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2476 (Breyer, J., concurring); Nelson E.
Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossraods, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 446, 453 (1985).
227. See Michael L. Seigel, Bringing Coherence to Mens Rea Analysis for Securities-Related
Offenses, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1563, 1564 (2006). Professor Seigel explains that the drafters of the
Model Penal Code “cut through [a] legacy of incoherence” surrounding the application of mens rea
when they established four rules for its application. Id. at 1565. One of these is that “an element of
mens rea . . .‘attaches’ to each of the . . . material elements of any given crime—the actus reii and
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Justification for the felony-murder rule rests on theories of deterrence
and retribution.228 Ultimately, the doctrine promotes the idea that someone
who decides to partake in a potentially dangerous felony should reasonably
anticipate any resulting injury and should therefore be held liable when
such injury in fact occurs.229 Knowledge of accessorial liability and its
potentially harsh punishment is intended to deter potential offenders by
compelling them to act with extreme caution in committing the felony or to
abandon its commission outright.230 The retributive aspect seeks to impose
greater punishment where greater harm has been caused (death), regardless
of whether the defendant intended such harm.231 Scholars have suggested
that this notion of “just deserts” is justified by a normative assumption that
people who commit felonies have generally deficient characters.232 In other
words, the decision to engage in criminal acts demonstrates inherent moral
impairment that renders such offenders culpable for any unintended
consequences.
2. Perversion of the Justifications for Punishment
“Few legal doctrines have been as maligned and yet have shown as great
a resiliency as the felony-murder rule. Criticism of the rule constitutes a
lexicon of everything that scholars and jurists can find wrong with a legal
doctrine: it has been described as ‘astonishing’ and ‘monstrous,’ an
unsupportable ‘legal fiction,’ ‘an unsightly wart on the skin of the criminal
law,’ and as an ‘anachronistic remnant’ that has 'no logical or practical
basis for existence in modern law.’”233
Because of its egregious disregard of some of the most basic principles
of criminal justice, it is an understatement to say that the felony-murder
rule “is a much-condemned doctrine.”234 Among its most compelling
attendant circumstances—and the requisite mens rea for each of these elements may in fact be
different.” Id. Felony murder is a blatant perversion of this rule. It substitutes mens rea that should
attach to the actus reus of murder with the mens rea that attaches to the actus reus of the underlying
felony.
228. See Flynn, supra note 145, at 1063 (citing JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
LAW § 31.06[B], at 516–19 (3d ed. 2001)); see also Kevin Cole, Killings During Crime: Toward a
Discriminating Theory of Strict Liability, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 74–78 (1990).
229. See Cole, supra note 228, at 106.
230. Flynn, supra note 145, at 1063. See also Cole, supra note 228, at 102.
231. See Roth & Sundby, supra note 226, at 457–58 .
232. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 228, at 99, 101 (“[I]n the felony-murder context, some of our
normal reluctance to make generalizations based on character are absent.”); Roth & Sundby, supra
note 226, at 457–58 (explaining that the rule is justified in part by the “evil mind” theory that “one
who does bad acts cannot complain about being punished for their consequences, no matter how
unexpected”).
233. Roth & Sundby, supra note 226, at 446.
234. See, e.g., Drizin & Keegan, supra note 225, at 528; George P. Fletcher, Reflections on
Felony Murder, 12 SW. U. L. REV. 413, 427–28 (1981) (arguing that the principle behind felony

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 4

844

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

criticisms are the arguments that both its deterrent and retributive
justifications fail, and that because it seeks to punish an offender for harm
he did not intend, it inevitably results in disproportionate punishment.235
And yet almost every state prosecutes both children and adults for felony
murder.236
The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized these criticisms. The
argument that the deterrent objective of felony murder fails is that
unintended or unforeseen acts (the resulting death) cannot logically be
deterred.237 In Enmund, the Court explained that when “a person does not
intend that life be taken . . . the possibility that the death penalty will be
imposed for vicarious felony murder will not ‘enter into the cold calculus
that precedes the decision to act.’”238 The Court in Enmund also noted a
lack of empirical evidence showing that the felony murder rule in fact
deters deaths.239 Additionally, critics of the rule argue that “a felonymurder rule is unnecessary to deter underlying felonies because those
felonies are deterred simply by increasing punishments for the intentional
felony offenses.”240
The retributive justification for felony murder—that punishment should
be determined in accordance with harm caused rather than harm
intended—has also been heavily criticized. That justification “fails to
capture a wrongdoer’s culpability properly,” 241 because culpability should
be based on an individual defendant’s criminal intent and accompanying
actions, and not simply on harm caused in the commission of a crime.242
murder violates “a basic principle of just punishment” since “[p]unishment must be proportional to
wrongdoing. When the felony-murder rule converts an accidental death into first-degree
murder . . . punishment is rendered disproportionate to the wrong for which the offender is
personally responsible.”); Gerber, supra, note 224, at 770 (“The doctrine contradicts our most basic
conception of proportionality.”); Roth & Sundby, supra note 226, at 446.
235. See supra note 234.
236. Flynn, supra note 145, at 1063 (citing DRESSLER, supra note 228 § 31.06[A], at 515
n.110, and explaining that Dressler notes “that only three states have rejected the [felony-murder]
rule and that a fourth state has imposed a mens rea requirement for felony-murder convictions”).
237. Id. at 1064 (citing DRESSLER, supra note 228 § 31.06[B][2], at 516–17); Roth & Sundby,
supra note 226, at 451.
238. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 799 (1982) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
186 (1976)). For deterrence to have any effect “the penalty must enter into the defendant’s
contemplation; thus, by definition, deterrence is inapplicable whenever an unintentional killing
occurs.” Roth & Sundby, supra note 226, at 485 (citing Enmund, 458 U.S. at 800).
239. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799 (“Competent observers have concluded that there is no basis in
experience for the notion that death so frequently occurs in the course of a felony for which killing
is not an essential ingredient that the death penalty should be considered as a justifiable deterrent to
the felony itself.”).
240. Flynn, supra note 145, at 1064; Roth & Sundby, supra note 226, at 452.
241. See Flynn, supra note 145, at 1065 (citing H.L.A. HART, Intention and Punishment, in
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 113, 130–31 (1968)).
242. See supra note 227 and accompanying text; Steven F. Shatz, The Eighth Amendment, The
Death Penalty, and Ordinary Robbery-Burglary Murderers: A California Case Study, 59 FLA. L.
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Again, the Supreme Court adopted this reasoning in Enmund when it stated
that “[i]t is fundamental that ‘causing harm intentionally must be punished
more severely than causing the same harm unintentionally.’”243 To fail to
distinguish between the intentional murderer and the robber who has no
murderous intent and takes no murderous action undermines the entire
thrust of retribution—it renders punishment for both less legitimate by
making any notion of proportionality moot.
C. Cruel and Unusual: Sentencing Juveniles Convicted of Felony
Murder to Life Without Parole
“Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious
reasoning if uncritically transferred to a determination of a State’s duty
toward children.”244
The serious theoretical shortcomings of felony murder liability apply
with exponentially greater force to juveniles.245 Sentencing a juvenile who
did not kill or intend to kill to life without parole serves neither deterrence
nor retribution—the “penological goals”246 presumably advanced by
punishing those guilty of felony murder—and the sentence therefore
violates the Eighth Amendment.247 As Roper, Graham, and Miller
implicitly suggest, the rationale underlying felony murder is utterly
incompatible with our modern understanding of juveniles.248
Justice Breyer explained in Miller that “the ability to consider the full
consequences of a course of action and to adjust one’s conduct accordingly
is precisely what we know juveniles lack capacity to do effectively.”249
This means that a juvenile is much less likely than an adult to recognize
that his participation in a robbery or other felony could potentially result in
REV. 719, 766 (2007) (“With respect to retribution, the Court has made clear that [it] must be
calibrated to the defendant’s culpability, which in turn depends on his mental state with regard to
the crime.”).
243. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798 (quoting H.L.A. HART, Punishment and the Elimination of
Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 158, 162 (1968)). The Enmund Court explained
that when using retribution as a justification for imposing the harshest possible penalty, “very much
depends on the degree of [the defendant’s] culpability,” including his “intentions, expectations, and
actions.” Id. at 800.
244. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2476 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting May v.
Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
245. Drizin & Keegan, supra note 225, at 531; Flynn, supra note 145, at 1065; Miller v.
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2476 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Given Graham, [Enmund’s]
holding applies to juveniles sentences of life without parole a fortiori.”).
246. Jackson Petition, supra note 48, at 29 (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026
(2010)).
247. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028.
248. See supra Part IV.
249. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2476 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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death or injury.250 Likewise, juveniles’ increased susceptibility to negative
peer influence “inhibit[s] their ability to withdraw from potentially deadly
situations when they are encouraged into wrongdoing by others.”251
Because adolescents “are less likely to foresee the consequences of their
actions and process the potential effects of their actions on others,” they are
less likely to be deterred by the specter of even the most severe
punishment.252 The gravity of a harsh sentence has little significance for
juveniles before it is imposed, and is a weak deterrent to their reckless
behavior. This is particularly true for life without parole, a sentence that
stretches indefinitely into a future children have not yet begun to
comprehend.253 Case studies show that juvenile offenders do not realize the
true finality of this sentence until many years after they have been
committed to prison.254 One individual articulated his understanding of his
sentence in an interview with Human Rights Watch:
It was very emotional and I broke out crying in court. I don’t
know if I fully understood but I kinda understood when they
just said, “guilty, guilty, guilty” and “life” y’know? As time
went on, I’m really starting to realize how serious it is. I was
young, I wasn’t really too educated. When I got locked up, I
was in the Eighth grade. All my education has come
through . . . being incarcerated.”255
For these reasons, the deterrence rationale—which is problematic as it
applies to adults punished for felony murder—has little plausibility when
applied to juveniles.
The retribution rational for felony murder is similarly weakened in the
case of juveniles. At “[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the
criminal offender.”256 As a starting point, the Court established in Roper
250. Id. at 29–30 (citing B. LUNA, The Maturation of Cognitive Control and the Adolescent
Brain, in FROM ATTENTION TO GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR 249, 252–56 (F. Aboitiz & D. Cosmelli
eds., 2009)). See also Flynn, supra note 145, at 1055 n.31 (citing Marty Beyer, Immaturity,
Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases, CRIM. JUST. Summer 2000, at 26, 27).
251. Jackson Petition, supra note 48, at 30 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026).
252. Flynn, supra note 145, at 1055.
253. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 82, at 154 (explaining that, “[a]dolescents, more than
adults, tend to discount the future and to afford greater weight to short-term consequences of
decisions,” and that “in part because adolescents have had less experience, considering the meaning
of a consequence that will only be realized ten or more years in the future may prove exceedingly
difficult.”).
254. THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 54.
255. Id.
256. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987))
(internal quotation marks omitted). As explained in Section IV.B above, the personal culpability of
a defendant is based on his intent (or state of mind) and his actions in committing a crime. See
supra notes 223–227 and accompanying text.
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that “[w]hether viewed as an attempt to express the community’s moral
outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the victim,
the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult.”257 In
Graham, the Court explained that “[t]he case becomes even weaker with
respect to a juvenile who did not commit homicide.”258 Although children
convicted of accessorial felony murder are technically homicide offenders,
the Court in Graham clearly stated that as a result of their child status and
lack of any homicidal intent, those juveniles “who [do] not kill or intend to
kill [have] a twice diminished moral culpability.”259 Therefore, despite
their technical conviction for homicide, children convicted of felony
murder who do not kill or intend to kill can never be among the most
culpable juvenile (homicide) offenders.260 It follows that they do not
deserve life imprisonment without parole, the harshest punishment
available for them.261 Simply put, because juveniles who do not kill or
intend to kill can never be among the most culpable juvenile offenders, this
most ultimate condemnation262 is necessarily excessive. Graham therefore
requires that each of these individuals be given a “meaningful opportunity
for release,”263 and an “opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and
self-recognition of human worth and potential.”264
None of this reasoning changes whether applied to Terrence Graham or
Kuntrell Jackson. Both were juveniles when they committed their crimes,
and neither exhibited the kind of criminal intent that merits the most severe
punishment. It is starkly incongruent with the logic of Graham to say that
life without parole is a cruel and unusual sentence for Terrence Graham,
who himself inflicted violence on his robbery victim but was fortunate
enough that no one was killed during its commission,265 but is not cruel
and unusual for Kuntrell Jackson, who inflicted no violence on his robbery
victim but whose accomplice made the poor choice to pull the trigger.266
As Justice Breyer concluded, if, upon remand, the trial court finds that
Kuntrell Jackson did not intend to kill the clerk, then “the Eighth
Amendment simply forbids imposition of a life term without the possibility

257. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 453 U.S. 551, 571 (2005)).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 2016.
260. See id. at 2027.
261. See id. at 2028 (“The considerations underlying [Roper’s] holding support as well the
conclusion that retribution does not justify imposing the second most severe penalty on the less
culpable juvenile nonhomicide offender.”).
262. See id. at 2027. Like death, “the sentence alters the [child’s] life by a forfeiture that is
irrevocable,” by depriving the child “of the most basic liberties without . . . hope of restoration.” Id.
263. Id. at 2033
264. Id. at 2032.
265. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
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of parole.”267
It is unfortunate that only Justices Breyer and Sotomayor in Miller were
willing to recognize that the Eighth Amendment, as interpreted by
Graham, requires a categorical rule against life without parole for juveniles
who do not kill or intend to kill.268 Such a rule is the only way to ensure
that these individuals do not receive this unconstitutional and excessive
punishment. However, even if the trial court in Kuntrell’s case does not
find that Graham’s reasoning categorically prohibits resentencing Kuntrell
to life without parole, a faithful application of Miller should preclude the
sentence. In conducting invididualized sentencing, lower courts should
recognize that Kuntrell Jackson and others like him are not among the
worst juvenile offenders. Courts should accordingly give these individuals
“some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation” when resentencing them.269
With these considerations in mind, Part V briefly addresses the
implementation of Miller by lower courts. First, it argues that lower courts
should follow Miller’s mandate of individualized sentencing by looking to
Supreme Court precedent on individualized sentencing in the capital
context. Second, it argues that in doing so, lower courts should recognize
that juveniles who did not kill or intend to kill cannot be among the most
culpable juvenile offenders, and should accordingly sentence these
individuals to something less than life without parole.
V. ATONING FOR OUR SINS AND THEIRS—GIVING OUR CHILDREN A
SECOND CHANCE WITH MILLER V. ALABAMA
“Then came Peter to him, and said, Lord, how oft shall my brother sin
against me, and I forgive him? till seven times? Jesus saith unto him, I say
not unto thee, Until seven times: but, Until seventy times seven.”“Then
Peter came up and said to him, ‘Lord, how often shall my brother sin
against me, and I forgive him? As many as seven times?’ Jesus said to him,
‘I do not say to you seven times, but seventy times seven.’”270
Going forward, Miller provides a chance at resentencing for the roughly
2,000 individuals who were mandatorily sentenced to life without parole as
juveniles.271 It also requires individualized sentencing for juvenile
267. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2477 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
268. Id. at 2475–76.
269. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2016.
270. Matthew 18:21 (King James).http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Matthew+
18%3A21-22&version=ESV.
271. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2477 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The Court in Miller
retroactively applied its holding to Kuntrell Jackson’s case, which was on collateral review at the
time, see id. at 2461, and remanded it for resentencing. Id. at 2475. This suggests that the Supreme
Court fully intended for Miller to apply retroactively to and require resentencing in all cases in
which a juvenile was mandatorily sentenced to life without parole. Still, the Court failed to clarify
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offenders currently facing imposition of that “harshest possible penalty for
juveniles.”272 In all of these cases, courts must ensure that the sentencer
(whether it be the judge or the jury) “take into account how children are
different”273 and “have the opportunity to consider [any other] mitigating
circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for
juveniles.”274
This is no small task. The Court in Miller did not prescribe how states
should implement this individualized sentencing. However, because
Miller’s rule is based on Eighth Amendment precedent requiring
individualized sentencing in the context of capital punishment,275 it follows
that lower courts (and practitioners) should look to these cases to
determine what constitutes mitigation, and how it should be presented and
considered at the trial level.
First, courts will ultimately need to conduct new sentencing hearings to
allow the sentencer to properly consider any mitigating qualities of youth
or of the circumstances of the offense.276 The opportunity to present
mitigating evidence in the capital context is meant to ensure that “the death
penalty is reserved only for the most culpable defendants committing the
most serious offenses.”277 Similarly, the opportunity to present mitigation
for juveniles facing life without parole is to ensure that only the most
culpable juvenile offender—or “the rare juvenile offender whose crime
reflects irreperable corruption”—may receive this most severe sentence.278
To this end, Miller requires the sentencer “to take into account how
children are different, and how those differences counsel against
irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”279
this directly, and lower courts are now split on the issue. For example, in People v. Williams, 2012
IL App 1st 111145 at *13–14, the First District Appellate Court of Illinois applied the standards for
retroactivity established by the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) and as
interpreted by the Illinois Supreme Court, and held that Miller should be applied retroactively
because “it is a rule that requires the observance of those procedures that are implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Alternatively, in an unpublished opinion, the
Third District Court of Appeal in Florida applied the Florida Supreme Court’s test for retroactivity
and held that Miller is not retroactive because it is a procedural change in the law and does not
“constitute a development of fundamental significance.” Geter v. State, No. 3D12–76, 2012 WL
4448860, at *3 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2012).
272. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. It is worth noting that the Court did not explicitly refer to “life
without parole” in its final holding. This ostensibly leaves open to principled attack other
mandatory sentences for juveniles.
273. Id. at 2469.
274. Id. at 2475.
275. Id.
276. See id. at 2467–68. Such a sentencing hearing would not be unlike the penalty phase in
the bifurcated trial of a capital case, which was first required by the Supreme Court in Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189–92 (1976).
277. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467.
278. Id. at 2469.
279. Id.
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At a minimum, the mitigating evidence that a sentencer must consider
under Miller includes an offender’s age at the time of the offense; the
extent of the offender’s participation in the offense and “the way familial
and peer pressures may have affected” this participation; the offender’s
“mental and emotional development”; the offender’s background,
including “family and home environment” and any abuse or trauma or
exposure to violence; and any evidence of the offender’s capacity for
change and rehabilitation.280 This list of mitigating factors in Miller is not
necessarily exhaustive, however. The Supreme Court has explained that an
individualized sentencing determination requires “a broad inquiry into all
relevant mitigating evidence,”281 and that “virtually no limits are placed”
on what this includes.282 As an example, extrapolating from precedent in
the capital context suggests that evidence of a juvenile offender’s capacity
to change may include his or her post-offense behavior.283
As to the presentation of mitigating evidence, the defense should be
prepared to put on, and trial courts should be prepared to hear, mitigation
experts at the sentencing hearings. An effective mitigation defense requires
the skillful collection and presentation of sensitive personal information
about a defendant’s background—skills in which most lawyers are not
well-versed—and as such, competent representation will most often
require a mitigation expert or specialist.284 Additionally, trial courts should
conduct these sentencing hearings with the understanding that “full
consideration” of evidence that mitigates against life without parole should
be considered by the sentencing body so that it may “give a reasoned moral
response to the defendant’s background, character, and crime.”285 This
means that trial courts conducting sentencing hearings under Miller should
ensure that the sentencer “have the ability to consider the mitigating
qualities of youth” and other circumstances of the offense so that the
sentencer may legitimately extend mercy to all but the most culpable
juvenile offenders.286
280. See id.
281. Buchanon v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 276 (1998).
282. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 285 (2004) (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
822 (1991) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982))).
283. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (holding that post-offense evidence
of the defendant’s good behavior during seventh months in jail awaiting trial constituted relevant
mitigating evidence).
284. See Russell Stetler, The Mystery of Mitigation: What Jurors Need to Make a Reasoned
Moral Response in Capital Sentencing, 11 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 237, pt. IV (2008).
285. See id. at 243–44 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989), in which the
Court “reaffirm[ed] the principle that punishment should be directly related to the personal
culpability of the criminal defendant in capital cases”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Stetler, a
renowned mitigation practitioner and scholar, explains that the jury’s fact-finding responsibility in
the sentencing phase of capital trials is a “moral” one “based on an ethic of caring, compassion, and
mercy.” Id.
286. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012).
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Ultimately, when weighing mitigating evidence at sentencing, the
sentencer should begin with an understanding that “given all [the Supreme
Court] ha[s] said in Roper, Graham, and [Miller] about children’s
diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change…appropriate
occasions for sentencing juveniles to [life without parole] will be
uncommon.”287 In Miller the Court explained that one of the reasons this
sentence should be rare “is…because of the great difficulty” in
distinguishing between those juvenile offenders who are incorrigible—or
“whose crime reflects irreperable corruption”—and those who are not.288 It
cautioned that considering what we know about youthful offenders’ great
capacity for transformation, a sentencer should refrain from making this
judgment in the majority of cases.289 Moreover, a sentencer should
recognize that this is particularly true in the case of many individuals
serving juvenile life without parole because their childhoods were replete
with trauma. The Sentencing Project’s recent national survey on juveniles
sentenced to life without parole illustrates this point: it provides empirical
evidence that many of these individuals had “childhoods…marked by
frequent exposure to domestic and community-level violence, problems in
school, engagement with delinquent peers, and familial incarceration.”290
Significantly, a staggering 79% of them witnessed violence in their own
homes before committing their crimes.291 Under Miller, this kind of
dysfunctional upbringing bears directly on a sentencer’s determination of
an offender’s culpability in committing his offense.292 For all of these
reasons, lower courts and juries properly resentencing individuals under
Miller should provide a second chance for many of them outside the walls
of adult prison.
Nowhere is this more clear than in the case of individuals like Kuntrell
Jackson. Regardless of other possible mitigating circumstances such as a
troubled childhood, those juveniles convicted of homicide offenses who
did not kill or intend to kill have not shown “irreparable corruption” 293 and
are not among the most culpable juvenile homicide offenders.294 Graham
made clear that a juvenile who lacks homicidal intent has “twice
diminished moral culpability.”295 So even without the benefit of a
categorical rule—which would properly ensure that no juvenile offender
who did not kill or intend to kill is unconstitutionally sentenced to life
without parole—courts resentencing individuals like Kuntrell Jackson
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id.
Id. at 2469.
Id.
See THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS, supra note 14, at 8.
Id. at 10.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.
See id.
See supra Section IV.C.
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010).
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should give them some meaningful opportunity for release.296
The Miller Court’s discussion of how the mitigating circumstances
surrounding Kuntrell Jackson’s case should bear on his culpability provide
an illustration of this point.297 The Court referred to the circumstances of
his case as those that “most suggest” a possibility for rehabilitation.298 It
noted that Kuntrell did not himself kill the clerk; the state did not argue
that he intended her to die; and the appellate court affirmed the verdict
rejecting Kuntrell’s affirmative defense only because the jury could have
believed that he warned the clerk that “we ain’t playin’,” rather than told
his codefendants that “I thought you all was playin’.”299 The Court also
explained that although Kuntrell learned that his codefendant Shields had a
gun on the way to rob the video store, “his age could well have affected his
calculation of the risk that posed, as well as his willingness to walk away at
that point.”300 In addition, the Court clarified that Kuntrell’s “family
background and immersion in violence”—in particular the fact that “both
his mother and grandmother had previously shot other individuals”—bear
on “[his] culpability for the offense.”301
To be clear: not all of the mitigating circumstances that apply to
Kuntrell are necessary for finding that life without parole is an excessive
punishment for a juvenile who does not kill or intend to kill.302 For
example, suppose a juvenile in Kuntrell’s position knew that his
accomplice was carrying a gun, or was present for the entire robbery. Or
suppose instead that this hypothetical juvenile participated in the robbery
to the same extent that Kuntrell did, but did not have his troubled
background. A sentencer would likely find such an individual to be more
culpable than Kuntrell Jackson, and accordingly sentence him to a longer
term of years. Such a determination would be appropriate. But a sentencer
would not be justified in making the determination that this individual is
among the most culpable juvenile homicide offenders, because of the
296. Some lower courts have already taken this course. In Rocker v. State, No. 2D10–5060,
2012 WL 5499975, at *2, 4 (Fla. 2nd Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2012), the Second District Court of
Appeal in Florida applied Miller and reversed the sentence of life without parole for Corey Rocker,
who was convicted of felony murder after his accomplice shot the victim of an attempted robbery.
In remanding to the trial court for resentencing, the court noted that “based on the reasoning in
Miller, a sentence of life without the possibility of parole would not be appropriate in this case
where there was no evidence that Rocker was the person who shot the victim or that he intended
that the victim be killed.” Id. at *4. See also Walling v. State, No. 1D11–4434, 2013 WL 335929, at
*1, 3 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2013) (reversing the defendant’s mandatory sentence of life
without parole for felony murder where the defendant did not kill the victim but helped plan the
robbery and secure the gun, and remanding for resentencing in accordance with Miller).
297. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468–69.
298. Id. at 2468.
299. Id. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
300. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.
301. Id.
302. See supra Section IV.C.
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simple fact that the offender did not himself kill or intend to kill.303 Under
Miller, sentencing courts—including Kuntrell’s—should give these
children a chance to transform and redeem themselves, and a meaningful
opportunity to one day create a life outside of prison.304
CONCLUSION
Over 2,500 individuals have been condemned to occupy the cold walls
of adult prisons for crimes they committed as children, and to remain there
until they die.305 Many of these children committed acts that deserve
significant punishment. However, “[l]ife without parole is an especially
harsh punishment for a juvenile.”306 It is indisputable that “[u]nder this
sentence a juvenile . . . will on average serve more years and a greater
percentage of his life in prison than an adult. . . .”307 This most ultimate
condemnation “gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no
chance for reconciliation with society,” and ultimately “no hope” for child
offenders. And yet we know that even children who commit terrible crimes
have the capacity to transform and redeem themselves in profound ways.308
Turning our backs on these children is a shameful departure from the
rehabilitative ideals that informed the creation of a separate juvenile
system,309 and from basic precepts of humanity, mercy, and compassion.
Kuntrell Jackson’s story highlights the extreme consequences that have
resulted from adjudicating and sentencing children as if they are adults. In
Roper, Graham, and now Miller, the Supreme Court has recognized that
the Eighth Amendment limits the adult punishment of juvenile offenders
in significant ways because of their “diminished culpability and heightened
capacity for change.”310 While the Court stopped short in Miller when it
declined to extend Graham’s categorical rule against life without parole to
juveniles who do not kill or intend to kill, Miller does provide the
possibility of a second chance for at least 2,000 of the individuals serving
this sentence.311 Most significantly, a sentencer must now consider all of
the mitigating qualities of youth in deciding whether to impose that
“harshest possible penalty” on a juvenile.312 The Court in Miller suggested
that this should preclude the vast majority of children from being
303. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010).
304. See supra notes 263–64and accompanying text.
305. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
306. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010).
307. Id. (explaining that “a 16-year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole
receive the same punishment in name only).
308. See supra notes 149–52 and accompanying text.
309. See supra Section II.A.
310. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
311. Id. at 2477 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
312. Id. at 2469 (majority opinion).
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condemned to die in prison, regardless of their crime.313 It also suggested
that children like Kuntrell Jackson, who do not kill or intend to kill, are not
deserving of this sentence. Lower courts should, and hopefully will,
recognize this as well.

313. See id. (“But given all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision about children’s
diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for
sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”).
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